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THE POWER TO PUNISH SUMMARILY FOR "DIRECT"
CONTEMPT OF COURT: AN UNNECESSARY
EXCEPTION TO DUE PROCESS
CONTEMPT OF COURT is uniformly classified either as "indirect" or
"direct,"' and it is well recognized that a judge can punish the latter
without a formal hearing. This summary2 power to punish a "direct"
contempt is obviously offensive to the traditional values of a fair trial5a
"A contempt is an act of willful disobedience, "calculated to embarrass, hinder, or
obstruct the court in the administration of justice." Ex parte Holbrook, 133 Me. 276,
280, 177 Ad. 418, 420 (1935). Contempts are generally classified as criminal or
civil. The former are subclassified as direct or indirect. Generally, criminal contempt
is committed against the majesty of the court, while a civil contempt is the failure to
execute some order of the court issued in a civil suit, and is prosecuted by the opposing
party. A direct contempt is one committed cin the-presence of the court," in contrast
to an indirect contempt which is committed "out of the presence of the court." In the
case of an indirect contempt, however, an order to show cause must issue, and a separate
hearing must be held. See Comments, 33 YALE LJ. 536 (1924); 2i HARV. L. REV.
x61 (i9o8). See also Fox, THE HIsTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT (1927) (wherein
the author suggests that there was no historical right to a jury trial for contempts in the
face of the court; notwithstanding evidence to the contrary compiled by an early writer
-Mr. Solly-Flood).
The power to punish summarily for contempt has been repeatedly criticized. Offutt
v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (i954); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925) ;
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 22 (1952) (dissenting opinion); Comments, 2
STAN. L. REV. 763 (1950) ; 31 COLUM. L. REV. 956 (i93i) ; 37 HARV. L. REV. 1oio
(1924). Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in Sacher v. United States, supra at 22, said,
"The historic power of summary contempt grew out of the need for judicial enforce-
ment of order and decorum in the courtroom and to compel obedience to court orders.
I believe the idea of judges having unrestricted power to by-pass the Bill of Rights
in relation to criminal trials and punishments is an illegitimate offspring of this coer-
cive contempt power. It has been said that a 'summary process of the Star Chamber
slipped into the common law courts,' and that the alleged ancient history to support its
existence is fiction "
'"Summary" has been held to refer to the method by which punishment is imposed,
thus allowing a judge to sentence at the end of the trial, without notice and hearing.
Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) ; criticized 37 CORNELL L.Q. 795 (1952),
66 HARV. L. REV. 170 (1952), 36 MINN. L. REv. 965 (1952). Previously, it had
been understood to mean the time and method in which punishment was imposed, re-
quiring an imposition immediately upon the occurrence of the contemptuous act. Cooke
v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925). Perhaps the Supreme Court returned to the
rationale of the Cooke case in Offutt v'. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (i954). See note
19 infra.
'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932): "It has never been doubted by this
court, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps
essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they, together with a legally
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but, on the other hand, it is said to be essential to the preservation of
those very values which it offends.4 For, since fairness in the adminis-
tration of justice can be guaranteed only to the extent that a court can
maintain order, dignity, and impartiality in its proceedings, the summary
contempt power is defended as a measure necessary for preserving this
proper decorum.5
In seeking to confine the exercise of this power within the limits of
its rationale, the courts have settled upon the phrase "in the presence of
the court," or some variant thereof,6 to define contemptuous conduct
competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the con-
stitutional requirements of due process of law"; Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522
(9z7): "That officers acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by
their interest in the controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule"; Rochin v.
California, 34z U.S. 165, r69 (1952); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust
Co., 339 U.S. 306, 310 (1950).
'E.g., Cooke v. United States, z67 U.S. 517, 534 (x925): "To preserve order in
the courtroom for the proper conduct of business, the court must act instantly to suppress
disturbance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court when occurring
in open court. There is no need of evidence or assistance of counsel before punishment,
because the court has seen the offense. Such summary vindication of the court's dignity
and authority is necessary . . . and the punishment imposed is due process of law"; Ex
parte Robinson, 85 U.S. (i 9 Wall.) 505, 5o (x873) (". .. essential to the preservation
of order") ; Anderson v. Dunn, 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 61 (8z) : "Courts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with power to impose
silence, respect, and decorum"; In re Cooper, 32 Vt. 253, 257 (859) (". . . implied,
because it is necessary to the exercise of all other powers") ; In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
274 (1948) (dictum): "This Court held [in Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888)]
that under such circumstances a judge has power to punish an offender at once, without
notice and hearing, although his conduct may also be punishable as a criminal offense.
This Court reached its decision because it believed that a court's business could not be
conducted unless it could suppress disturbances within the courtrom by immediate pun-
ishment." See also cases cited in note 5 infra.
5 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954) ; Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. I
(195z); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (888) Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. 12os,
No. 11350 (1835); Weldon v. State, i5o Ark. 407, 234 S.W. 466 (1921); People
ex rel. Field v. Turner, i Cal. r5z (1850) ; State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, z69
Pac. 793 (1928). See also Comment, 37 HARv. L. REV. oxo, 1023 (1924), and
cases cited in note 4 supra. As to the congressional power to deal with contempts, see
Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 571, 541 (1917): "[T]he power rests simply upon the
implication that the right has been given to do that which is essential to the execution
of some other and substantive authority expressly conferred. . . . Hence, it rests solely
upon the right of self-preservation to enable the public powers to be exerted. . . . [W] t
think from the very nature of that power that it is clear that it does not embrace
punishment for contempt as punishment. . . ."; Anderson v. Dunn, 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
6r, 69 (18z) ("the least possible power adequate to the end proposed").
aNye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (194); Ex parte Poulson, 19 Fed. Cas. xzoS,
No. 11350 (x835) ("so near the presence of the court as to obstruct the administration
which can be termed "ldirect"-and hence summarily punishable. This
phrase, in addition, recognizes that, in fairness to the accused, only a
judge who could observe the contemptuous nature of the conduct in
open court should be invested with this power.' Having adopted this
short-hand formula, some courts have, however, ignored the broader
considerations to which the phrase was intended to give expression and,
by an uncritical application, have rationalized the imposition of summary
punishment in exactly the type of situation which it was designed to
exclude.8
of justice") i Cooke v. United States, z67 U.s. 517 (19z5) ("in open court") ; Savin,
Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267 (x889) 5Ex parte Clark, 2o8 Mo. 12i, io6 S.W. 990 (907)
("presence of the court") 5 People ex rel. Field v. Turner, I Cal. 15z (1850) ("in its
presence") i In re Wood, 8z Mich. 75, 45 N.W. 1113 (1890) ("the immediate view and
presence") 5 FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a) ("actual presence") 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 286 (16th ed. 1875) ("face of the court").
7 See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 536 (1925): 'Punishment without issue
or trial was so contrary to the usual and ordinarily indispensible hearing before judg-
ment, constituting due process, that the assumption that the court saw everything that
went on in open court was required to justify the exception. . . ." In re Wood, 8z
Mich. 75, 82, 45 N.W. 1113, 1115 (189o): ". . . contempts not committed in (the
courtes) immediate view and presence must be brought before the court by affidavit of
the persons who witnessed them, or have knowledge of them. . . ." Cf. In re Oliver,
333 U.S. 257, 272 (948) (dictum) : "This Court said that knowledge acquired from
the testimony of others, or even from the confession of the accused, would not justify
conviction without a trial in which there was an opportunity for defense." Savin,
Petitioner, I31 U.S. 267, 277 (1889); Nelles, The Summary Power to Punish for Con-
tempt, 31 CoLuM. L. REv. 956 (1931 ) ; Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress
Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A4 Study in Sepa-
ration of Powers, 37 HARv. L. REv. ioio (1924).
8 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33, 48 (1940) : "The question is whether the words
'so near thereto' have a geographical or a causal connotation. Read in their context
and in the light of their ordinary meaning, we conclude that they are to be construed
as geographical terms." Savin, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 267, 277 (1889) (attempted bribery
in a witness waiting room) : "We are of opinion that, within the meaning of the statute,
the court, at least when in session, is present in every part of the place set apart for its
own use, and for the use of its officers, jurors and witnesses; and misbehavior anywhere
in such place is misbehavior in the presence of the court." In Weldon v. State, 150
Ark. 407, z34 S.W. 4.66 (i92), defendant in a pending case attacked the judge at a
beach resort. The imposition of summary punishment by that judge for contempt was
affirmed on the ground that the assault occurred in the "constructive presence" of the
court. Cf. State -v. Goff, 88 S.E.2d 788 (S.C. 1955), where an assault committed on
the back steps of the courthouse, while the court was in recess and the jury retired to
consider a verdict, was held a direct contempt, since the court was "present" throughout
the building in which it sat. In United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (i9o6) (on
demurrer), 714 U.S. 386 (19o9) (on the merits), a Negro was lynched on the day his
appeal from a rape conviction had been granted by the United States Supreme Court.
The Court exercised original jurisdiction to "punish summarily" the sheriff and the
leaders of the mob.
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Illustrative is the recent case of Lyons v. Superior Court,' where the
question presented was whether petitioner's tardiness, when he was sole
counsel for defendant in a felony proceeding, was a "direct" contempt
of court, for which he could be sentenced summarily to the county jail.
In affirming the trial court's summary punishment, the majority rea-
soned that the tardiness was such a participation in the trial as to be
within the immediate view and presence of the court and that it tended
to obstruct the administration of justice."0
Since the court could observe the fact that petitioner was absent,
there is no surface difficulty in concluding that the absence occurred "in
the presence of the court."" But, clearly, only inexcusable tardiness is
contemptuous,' 2 and the lack of an excuse would be an element essential
to petitioner's contempt conviction. Inasmuch as the court had no first-
hand knowledge as to whether the contempt was excusable, then only
by a mechanical application of the "formula" could it conclude that the
contempt was "direct" and summarily punishable. Furthermore, it is
evident that the obstruction to the administration of justice, which had
already occurred, could hardly be redressed by imposing summary
punishment; nor could the dignity of the court be vindicated any better
in a summary than in a plenary proceeding.
This latter observation raises the broader question as to whether
there actually are any situations in which the summary contempt power
is necessary to accomplish the ends which purportedly justify its use.
It is suggested that the reasoning advanced to sustain this power often
43 Cal.zd 755, 278 P.zd 681 (x955).
"0 Petitioner offered illness as an excuse for his tardiness of thirty-five minutes. The
court declined to believe this excuse, noting that petitioner had been habitually tardy.
Compare In re McHugh, 152 Mich. 5o5, z16 N.W. 459 (z908), where the court held
that an attorney's voluntary offer of a defense in a summary proceeding constituted a
waiver of his right to a later plenary trial. If the courts are to hold that a contemnor,
in offering an explanation or excuse in such cases, waives his right to notice and hearing,
attorneys will certaintly be discouraged from offering any defense, even thought it might
be substantial. Such a practice would seem undesirable, in view of the probability that
most contempt situations are cleared up by explanation and apology.
" But see the language of the court in Ex parte Clark, zo8 Mo. 121, 148, io6 S.W.
990, 997 (1907) : "It would seem like an exquisite and palpable contradiction of terms
to complain in one breath that the petitioner and his acts were absent, and in the next
breath to say that such absence constituted a presence .... 1
"See Ex parte Clark, Id. at 148, io6 S.W. at 997: "The absence of an attorney,
•.. from the court room at the precise time due there may be susceptible of many inno-
cent explanations .... [N]one of these explanations are within the mere eyesight or ear-
shot of any court of ordinary mortal endowments." Muffly v. State, 129 Neb. 334, z61
N.W. 56o (1935) 5 Wise v. Commonwealth, 97 Va. 779, 34 S.E. 453 (t899).
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fails to distinguish between punishment which is sufficient to remove
an obstruction to the administration of justice, or to vindicate the dignity
of the court, and punishment which is necessary to accomplish these pur-
poses.13 Indeed, if the test of necessity is applied to the various situa-
tions in which the power has been invoked, the apparent conclusion is
that it has no justification at all.14 Consider, for example, the dearest
case-a calculated disturbance in the courtroom, intended by its perpe-
trator not only to obstruct the proceeding, but to insult the court. In-
stead of punishing the offender summarily, the judge could order him
arrested immediately and charged with the crime of contempt. The
obstruction to the administration of justice would thereby be removed;
and the vindication of the dignity of the court could be postponed to a
separate hearing.
At least one commentator has maintained that the summary con-
tempt power should continue to be tolerated as a petty power to deal
with petty offenses.15 To this it might be answered that, if the offenses
are petty, they should not justify an exception to constitutional pro-
cedural rights.10 The only basis for such an exception is not expediency,
but necessity; and, absent a necessity, the exception should fail.'
7
" It is recognized that the summary contempt power exists as an exception to prin-
ciples of due process. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 1o4-o5 (1924) ; Sacher v.
United States, 34.3 U.S. 1, 36 (595z); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 440
(5932). Therefore it would seem that the "necessity" which justifies such a sui generis
power must be a strict necessity-not merely an expediency. Marshall v. Gordon, 243
U.S. 521, 543 (1917) (reasoning that the power rests "solely" upon "the right of
self-preservation") ; Anderson v. Dunn, 5 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 6x (x821).
" See I COMPLETE WORKS OF EDWARD LIVINGSTON ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
258-267 (1873). Mr. Livingston contends that the "plea of necessity" should be
limited to the power to remove obstructions to the courts' orderly processes and does not
justify the existence of summary power to punish for contempt. He points out that in
this one area, a judge holds all three governmental functions--to define, prosecute and
punish such offenses. Since judges are only human, he urges that all contempts should
be statutorily defined as criminal offenses and punishable only in accordance with this
defined law. Degrees of contempt would be recognized and the offender would, there-
fore, be dealt with according to the nature of his offense. If an attorney were charged
with contempt during a trial, the hearing on this charge could be deferred until the
end of the trial.
Nelles, op. dit. supra note 7.
x Comment, 33 YALE L.J. 536 (1924) (if the punishment is inflicted to deter others,
then it is purely penal in character, and the alleged contemnor should be afforded the
protections granted a defendant in a criminal trial).
"'Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 541 (1917): "[W]e think from the very
nature of that power it is clear that it does not embrace punishment for contempt as
punishment, since it rests only upon the right of self-preservation. ... " See note 13
$upra.
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Reconsideration by the courts of a power so discordant with due
process is always timely, though its existence has long been asserted. At
the present, there is some indication that reconsideration is taking place
and may eventually lead to the complete abolition of this power.18 It
is submitted that such an abolition would be consistent with the efficient
administration of justice and would better accord with the requirements
of a fair trial.
PAUL V. EVANS
18 Due process of law requires notice and hearing before an impartial tribunal. See
note 3 supra. In Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954), the Court, relying on
Cooke v. United States, 267 U.s. 517 (1925)
, 
held that when a judge becomes per-
sonally "embroiled" with an attorney during a trial, fairness requires that the offended
judge may not impose summary punishment, but instead another judge must hear the
contempt proceeding. The result is to grant the accused a full, plenary hearing, under
the holding of the Cooke case, supra. Having taken this first step, so soon after the
decision in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (x952), see note z supra, the present
Court may well eventually take the second, completely abolishing summary punishment.
